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MEASURING THE CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS -
A STUDY OF INCOMPLETE CONSIDERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
T HE problem of determining the custody of children presents the
courts with the task of resolving complex social issues within
a framework of legal rules and procedures. Today the governing
legal principle in custody matters is that the best interests of the
child will be the paramount consideration.1 In theory this doctrine
has great merit since the words "best interests of the child" seem
to recognize the social aspect of child custody while providing a
legal justification for the court's award, based upon the guidelines
of a sound and equitable rule of law.
At the same time this rule has opened new channels of inquiry
to the courts to aid them in weighing the intricate human factors
that comprise a custody proceeding. The courts now often appoint
investigators or social workers to analyze the various non-legal facets
of a custody matter, accepting their reports and recommendations as
evidence to aid them in arriving at a decision.
2
In the final analysis, however, it is the judge himself who, in
the exercise of his discretion,' must render his decision in the child's
best interests. He must sift through the psychological test reports
and the social worker's statistical data, maintaining an awareness of
the human equities of the situation.4 Then he must assimilate the
evidence according to his own notions of what is really in the best
interests of the child.
These notions reflect traditional assumptions of social behavior,
yet from the standpoint of the behavioral sciences they are incom-
plete. An awareness of the sociological implications and ramifica-
tions of these conceptions might aid the judge, faced with the di-
1 Oster, Custody: A Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. FAM. L. 21 (1965) ;
Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 672 (1942). For cases in vari-
ous jurisdictions see 24 AM. JuR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 783 (1966).
2 Fewel v. Fewel, 23 Cal. 2d 431, 144 P.2d 592 (1943) ; Gluckstern v. Gluckstern, 2 App.
Div. 2d 744, 153 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1956); West v. West, 208 S.C. 1, 36 S.E.2d 856
(1946).
3 Usually the decision of the trial court will not be overruled unless there has been a clear
abuse of discretion. Bunim v. Bunim, 298 N.Y. 391, 83 N.E.2d 848 (1949). See also
Oster, supra note 1, at 23.
4 One judge described the situation as follows:
These contested child custody cases are never easy, and this case is no excep-
tion. From the nature of such disputes, involving as they do one of the basic
instincts and great primal urges of human existence, whichever way judges
rule is bound to leave a trail of heartache and pain. But decide them we must,
for it is our job....
Bowler v. Bowler, 355 Mich. 686, 694, 96 N.W.2d 129, 133 (1959).
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lemma of a child custody determination, in the exercise of his dis-
cretion for the best interests of the child.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE BEST INTERESTS RULE
At early common law the courts based their decisions in custody
matters primarily on the principle of the father's property right in
the child." The concept of a child as property vested in the father
gave him an almost absolute custody right. Little attention was
given to the interests of the mother, who as a married woman had
relinquished her property rights to her husband. Likewise, the wel-
fare of the child was not always considered. The father by virtue
of his property right was considered the child's natural guardian
and as such was entitled to custody. It was only upon proof of
misconduct on the part of the father resulting in abuse of the child
that the father's natural guardianship would not prevail.'
Gradually this strict doctrine favoring the father was modified
by statute in England' and by case law and statute in the United
States' toward a recognition of an equal right to custody in the
mother. The traditional property right concept became replaced by
more equitable considerations concerning the welfare of the child,
resulting in the development of the best-interests-of-the-child rule.
The underlying principle of the rule is that no longer does
either parent have a prima facie right to the child's custody. Hence-
forth, the court will exercise its discretion for the child's best inter-
ests.9 The best interests rule seemed at the time to serve as a panacea
for the delicate problems with which the courts had been faced of
overcoming presumptions in favor of one parent or the other.10
The principle was codified in the United States in varying
forms," but always giving the courts a broad guideline for their
determination of custody. Within the penumbra of the rule, the
courts were forced to create various classifications of abstract terms
indicative of the child's best interests to be used as criteria for the
5 Cf. Ex parle Skinner, 9 Moore C.P. 278, 29 Rev. R. 710 (C.P. 1824) ; Rex v. Greenhill,
4 Ad. & E. 624, 111 Eng. Rep. 922 (K.B. 1836).
6 Re Spence, 2 Ph. 247 (1847).
7 Talfourd's Act, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 54; Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, 49 & 50
Vict., c. 27.
8 For a collection of American cases showing this shift toward recognition of the mother's
right to custody, see Ex parte Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226 S.W. 936 (1920).
9 Oster, supra note 1, at 22.
10 "For that matter, the law reviews and critical writers generally approve this test
without exception and hail the high achievement of the courts in deciding this
delicate question by such worthy principles. Courts and legal writers alike seem
so pleased with themselves in hitting on the best-interests-of-the-child test,
that they are both unable and unwilling to think of anything else."
Sayre, supra note 1, at 678.
11 Oster, supra note 1, at 22.
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adjudication of custody cases. Such measures as age and sex of the
child, preference of the child, and fitness of the parent are examined
in the cases for the purpose of determining the child's best inter-
ests. 2 These are the considerations announced by the courts which
serve to reveal the underlying assumptions upon which custody is
awarded in the exercise of discretion.
II. CUSTODY BETWEEN PARENTS: THE UNDERLYING NOTIONS
A. Age of the Child: A Relative Concept
Many jurisdictions will award custody of very young children
to the mother."3 In Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick,14 the husband sought
to have the custody decree awarding the five-year-old daughter to
the mother changed in his favor. The trial court granted custody to
the father, but the appellate court reversed the decree, saying, "There
is the natural right of the mother, who is not shown to be unfit, to
nurture and care for her child of tender years, and ordinarily the
child's best interests are served by her love, care and attention.' ""
Little consideration was given to the fact that the husband had re-
married, and that his new wife was always at home and willing to
care for the child. The mother, on the other hand, was working at
the time the divorce was granted and had worked ever since, hiring
babysitters to care for the child. As to these facts, the court simply
concluded that the husband's remarriage disclosed no change of con-
ditions that would support a modification in the custody decree and
that the child who was of kindergarten age would no longer need
babysitters as much as before. 6
While the child of five in the Fitzpatrick case was considered
to be of "tender years," children of ten and twelve were not so
classified in Nicol v. Conlan,17 where custody was awarded to the
father.
In some jurisdictions the preference of the child is given con-
sideration by the courts, provided that he has reached a certain age.
In Hurly v. Hurly,' the custody of two girls, aged eleven and thir-
12 Ibid.
Is Ross v. Ross, 89 Colo. 536, 541, 5 P.2d 246, 249 (1931):
"Courts are disposed - properly so - to award to the mother ... custody
of very young children, especially girls, even where the mother's conduct has
been such that, if the child were older its custody would have been placed else-
where."
Accord, Leary v. Leary, 61111. App. 2d 152, 209 N.E.2d 663 (1965) ; Payne v. Payne, 399
S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
14 207 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965).
15 Id. at 797.
16 Ibid.
17 385 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965).
18 411 P.2d 359 (Mont. 1966).
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teen was awarded to the father. The court reasoned, "We cannot
overlook the present ages of both; each child is at sufficient age to
form an intelligent opinion as to custody."'" The consideration of
a child's age from the legal standpoint seems to serve a twofold
purpose. It can be used to determine the parental needs of the child
"of tender years" or it can serve as a measure of the merit in allow-
ing the child to exercise his choice.
A sociological analysis of this issue discloses that any arbitrary
age at which maturity is reached is impossible to calculate for all
children. A young boy or girl may reach physical maturity at an
early age ahead of his emotional experiences. ° The critical time of
puberty may not always conform to the chronological norms which
the law imposes, and this conflict between legal requirements and
actual conditions deserves recognition by the courts.
Under the age and sex tests used by the courts when applying
the best interests rule, a teen-aged girl may be placed in the father's
custody for reasons of preference or economy at an age when she
needs a mother's understanding. One court has recognized the socio-
logical problems involved in any arbitrary chronological age of legal
maturity. In Russell v. Russell2 the argument was raised that a
child under the age of fourteen was "of tender years" because a
statute declared that a child over fourteen could choose his own
guardian. The court found the contention to be unsound, reasoning
that:
The Legislature has not declared that a child under the age of 14
years is to be treated by the courts as a child of tender years within
the meaning of those terms as used in section 246 of the Civil
Code. The sex is to be considered as is also the physical develop-
ment. There cannot be any fixed and certain age of minority which,
in all cases and for all purposes, can be said to constitute a child of
"tender years." 22
B. Fitness of the Parent: The Notion of Motherhood
The test to determine the fitness of the parent to have
custody is most revealing of the underlying assumptions of the best
interests rule. One criterion is, "which parent can best provide an
atmosphere conducive to the child's healthy growth? '2 3 In the case
of Gluckstern v. Gluckstern,'24 the custody of a seven-year-old boy
was awarded to the mother, despite the fact that, since she was a
Christian Scientist, doubts were raised whether she would provide
19 Id. at 361-62.
20 SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 94-95 (4th ed. 1947).
21 20 Cal. App. 457, 129 Pac. 467 (1912).
22 d. at 461, 129 Pac. at 468.
2 Oster, supra note 1, at 25.
2417 Misc.2d 83, 158 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Sup. Ct.), af'd, 165 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1st Dept.),
ajffd, 4 N.Y.2d 699, 151 N.E.2d 897 (1958).
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the child with proper medical care. The court reasoned that if cus-
tody of the child were awarded to his father, the child would be
deprived of the adult companionship he needed, due to the father's
absence from the home during his working hours. On the other hand,
if the boy were given to his mother, "he would enjoy the companion-
ship, care and parental guidance normally received by a child of his
age."
25
The court's assumption favoring the mother as being more fit
to have custody of the child rested on its traditional concept of the
motherhood role. The notion of motherhood is inextricably linked
to any conception of the home, family, and child. Its natural attri-
butes have been described as love, care, and nurture of the child.21
As one legal writer has said, "The assumption is that woman, by
nature or culture or through a combination of natural and cultural
forces, is better suited than man for providing the care every child
needs."
27
Conversely, the notion of the father's traditional role in the
family is equally as pervasive in the court's determination of paren-
tal fitness. This notion has been ably described by a sociologist and
expert on family relations.
The average father is lacking in appropriate "child-care" skills, be-
cause his socialization in the male role has (1) led him to deprecate
such skills, (2) required him to have little practice in them, and
(3) permitted him to hand the appropriate duties over to his wife.
The role of husband and father, moreover, is defined particularly
as breadwinner, and with few exceptions in our society this activity
requires at least eight hours or so daily for at least five days weekly,
at the times when children require most care.28
Society's concept of motherhood, which many courts employ in
their application of the best interests rule, seems to create a pre-
sumption in favor of the mother that can only be overcome by a
showing of unfitness which would place the mother at fault.29
It is difficult to describe with precision the positive attributes
that constitute the court's notion of motherhood. The term is as
undefinable as the best interests rule itself. Insight into the concept
can be gained, however, by examining the negative attributes of
motherhood, evidenced by a mother's behavior by which the courts
deem her unfit to have custody.
In Bunim v. Bunim,30 the wife was admittedly shown to have
committed repeated adulteries with another married man. The court
25 Id. at 85, 158 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
28 Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 207 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965).
2 Oster, supra note 1, at 26.
28 GOODE, AFTER DIVORCE 312 (1956).
2 Oster, supra note 1, at 29.
30 298 N.Y. 391, 83 N.E.2d 848 (1949).
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found that such conduct was "repugnant to all normal concepts of
sex, family, and marriage,"" and awarded custody to the father.
While the court couched its reasoning in terms of "sex, family, and
marriage," it seems clear that the wife's moral transgressions had
contradicted its basic notion of motherhood. 2 It would seem to be
inconsistent that a wife can be an adultress and a proper mother at
the same time.
However, the wife's adulterous conduct does not always create
a presumption against her in custody matters. In Verdin v. Wade,3"
a mother who was pregnant by her lover was successful in regaining
custody of her two children after she subsequently married him.
The court reasoned that her present "path of rectitude" was more
important than her past misconduct in determining the question of
custody.34 The woman's moral misconduct may or may not conflict
with the court's notion of motherhood, depending on the peculiar
facts and mitigating circumstances of each case. It is submitted that
in Verdin, the mother's marriage to her lover not only legitimized
her child but also restored the image of motherhood and family
which had been previously shaken by her adulterous conduct.
Alcohol and motherhood are as incompatible as drinking and
driving in terms of a mother's fitness to have custody. The alcoholic
mother finds difficulty in receiving custody of her children.35 Her
drinking seems to contradict the devotedness a court expects in a
mother.
Since the notion of motherhood is so closely related to the
concept of the home, the fact that a mother neglects her household
duties may be a consideration in depriving her of custody.3" Also,
if the mother has voluntarily relinquished custody of her child by
abandonment or agreement, custody is very often given to the fa-
ther.3 7  By her abandonment she seems to have contradicted the
concept of motherhood and raised serious doubts as to her fitness
31 Id. at 394, 83 N.E.2d at 849.
32 For other cases where an adulterous mother has lost custody, see Grubaugh v. Grubauzh
200 Cal. App. 2d 151, 19 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1962) ; Heater v. Heater, 254 Iowa 586, 118
N.W.2d 587 (1962) ; Shrout v. Shrout, 224 Ore. 521, 356 P.2d 935 (1960). In Parker
v. Parker, 222 Md. 69, 158 A.2d 607 (1960), there was an inferred presumption that
the mother was unfit to have custody if found guilty of adultery.
3 129 So.2d 571 (La. Ct. App. 1961 ).
34 Id. at 573. But see Keer v. Cress, 194 Pa. Super. 529, 168 A.2d 788 (1961).
35 Floyd v. Floyd, 218 Ga. 606, 129 S.E.2d 786 (1963) ; Lichtenberg v. Lichtenberg., 15
Wash. 2d 226, 130 P.2d 371 (1942).
36 Howells v. Howells, 79 S.D. 480, 113 N.W.2d 533 (1962).
37Leach v. Leach, 179 Kan. 557, 296 P.2d 1078 (1956) ; Townsend v. Townsend, 358
S.W.2d 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962); In re Smith, 222 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
In the cases involving parental agreement, it might be argued that the wife relinquished
her right to custody solely because she could not otherwise have obtained the divorce




to be trusted with the child's custody. In Ullman v. Ullman,8 the
father had been awarded custody of his 212-year-old child in a sepa-
ration decree alleging abandonment by the wife. The court acknowl-
edged that "the child at tender age is entitled to have such care,
love and discipline as only a good and devoted mother can usually
give,'"'" but found that in the light of her voluntary act of abandon-
ment, "it would be a strange inconsistency should the court, after
deciding that the mother had gone unjustifiably from her husband's
house, visit upon him the penalty of the home broken by her fault
and of losing his child....
Some of these tests of parental fitness are closely allied with
the traditional fault concept. In determining the fitness of the
parent, the premise seems to be that the fit parent is the one who
is not at fault. The woman who does not conform to the notion
of motherhood is at fault and the assumption is that the father will
better care for the child.
C. Modern Roles of the Mother
A role analysis of the family members is a useful tool of sociolo-
gists in determining family relationships and attitudes. Motherhood
is only one of the various sociological roles assumed by the wife in
our society. The behavioral scientist recognizes the other emerging
roles of companion and partner played by the modern American
wife.
41
The companion role depicts the wife as enjoying the privilege
of being the object of romantic aspirations and having leisure time
for social or educational activity. The duties of the companion role
include the wife's cultivation of social contacts beneficial to the
husband and the maintenance of intellectual alertness.
The partner role obliges the wife to contribute to the financial
support of the family according to her earning ability and to main-
tain the status of the family by success in a career. The wife as
partner enjoys the privilege of equal status with the husband, ex-
emption from domestic duties to him, and financial independence.
While these two emerging roles may appear distinctly attribut-
able to specific socio-economic groups, they in fact overlap and are
commingled. One finds that a companion-wife in the upper middle
class may often be working, an obligation peculiar to the partner
38 151 App. Div. 419, 135 N.Y. Supp. 1080 (1912).
39 Id. at 424-25, 135 N.Y.Supp. at 1083.
40 Id. at 421, 135 N.Y.Supp. at 1081.
41 See generally BROOM & SELZNICK, SOCIOLOGY 369-72 (3d ed. 1963). A detailed de-
scription of several roles of the American wife is found in BOSKOFF, THE SOCIOLOGY
OF URBAN REGIONS 157-59 (1962).
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role.42 However, her motivations for discharging this function of
the partner role may in fact be toward the fulfillment of her role
as companion, such as an attempt to overcome the boredom that can
accompany leisure.43 She may be economically motivated, not to
maintain financial stability in the family, but to retain its upper
class social status for the preservation and cultivation of advanta-
geous social contacts of her husband.
The commingling of these two roles and their underlying moti-
vations are as important for this discussion as the suggestion that
both of these roles are distinguishable from, and represent a depar-
ture from the traditional motherhood role assumed by the courts.
If equal consideration were given to these emerging roles of the
modern wife and mother in our society, it might be discovered that
the mother in a custody matter may no longer be confined to tra-
ditional household and child-rearing duties consistent with the no-
tion of motherhood. Instead, she may very often be actively engaged
in outside social activities within the upper middle class or may be
working.
D. Motherhood and Family Unity: Practical Difficulties
Assuming that the wife has fulfilled the court's notion of
motherhood on the basis of her conduct prior to the custody award,
the issue is raised whether she will in fact continue to fulfill this
role as a single parent. An examination of this question rests on
the concept of the organization of the family in our culture. Family
unity is a desired goal in our society in which the role of mother-
hood plays a major part.
However, marriage does not automatically give rise to a family
relationship as expected, but may in fact amount to no more than
a means of legitimizing the child conceived out of wedlock.44 Fur-
thermore, the family in a custody matter is always a disunited family.
Its structure as an organized unit has been dissolved by the divorce
or separation decree. Kingsley Davis has described the plight of
the child in such a disunited family:
Having formed a union which is socially defined, which involves
mutual rights and obligations, and which clearly has as its main
function the rearing of children, the parents separate and thus de-
prive the child of its socially prescribed milieu. If he remains with
one parent he lacks the other- a real loss, because each parent
plays a necessary and complementary role in the child's life.
4
5
42 For a discussion on married women in the labor force, see MILLER & FORM, INDUSTRIAL
SOCIOLOGY: THE SOCIOLOGY OF WORK ORGANIZATIONS 59-60 (2d ed. 1964).
43For a discussion on boredom as an attribute of the companion role, see BROOMI & SELZ-
NICK, op. cit. supra note 41, at 370.
"Goode, Family Disorganization, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 491 (2d ed.
Merton & Nisbet ed. 1966).
45 Davis, Sociological and Statistical Analysis, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 700 (1944).
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An anthropological approach to the concept of family organi-
zation shows the shortcomings of any notion of family unity in
American custody matters. The family structures of various cultures
are divided into two basic types. The nuclear or conjugal family
structure consists of the husband, wife, and children. The extended
or consanguine family is made up of several blood relatives and
their own conjugal units. The extended family consists of the clan,
a wider concept of the kinship group.
46
The structure of the modern American family is dominantly
conjugal,4 7 whereas the family in many non-Western cultures is of
the extended type. Care and custody of children in an extended
family relationship presents few problems, since the cultural values
do not consider the immediate family as the sole or most important
kinship unit, and the functions of child rearing are distributed from
the outset. The child thinks of his family not as centering around
his immediate parents, but as a joint household of various blood
relatives. Therefore, if a divorce or separation occurs, the child's
family unit is not really dissolved, since the remaining clan mem-
bers continue to fulfill the duties of child raising. 8
In the American conjugal family, however, divorce or separa-
tion of the parents means dissolution of the unit. As Kingsley Davis
observes:
With the principle of kinship substitution and the custom of the
great household abandoned, the child of a ... divorced parent has as
a rule nowhere to turn except to the other parent. He does not re-
tain the balanced family life that a child in a kinship society is likely
to have. He is therefore a 'problem' in a much more pressing sense.
49
Upon the dissolution of the nuclear family by divorce or separa-
tion, three responses of the remaining spouse may be manifested. 5°
(1) Reconstruction of the Basic Unit With a New Member. The
parent can remarry with the anticipation that her new spouse will
legally adopt the children to restore the family to its original state
or take on a lover who will fill part of the role of the missing parent
but may not restore the family to a legitimized nuclear status. The
remaining spouse may also find a surrogate parent for the child in
the person of a relative or housekeeper. (2) Reorganization of the
Remaining Members By Assignment of New Roles Within the
Structure. The parent may reassign obligations performed by the
absent spouse to herself and her children, such as delegating her
46 See generally BROOM & SELZNICK, op. cit. supra note 41, at 355-56.
47 1bid.
48 Davis, supra note 45, at 701.
49 1d. at 705.
50 See generally WINCH, THE MoDERN FAMILY 721 (rev. ed. 1965).
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usual household chores to her children and assuming a new role of
provider herself. (3) Dissolution of the Family Unit. The parent
may terminate the nuclear family by taking the children to live with
grandparents.
When any of these three responses is manifested, any tradi-
tional notion of motherhood seems to be undermined, due to the
practical difficulties with which the divorced custodian is faced.
As Robert F. Drinan has stated, "It seems fair to say that American
law has not thought out a consistent legal theory by which the once-
married but emancipated, and now divorced, woman can fulfill all
her duties to . . . the children over whom she has custody."'"
In a few jurisdictions a tacit sociological analysis of the issues
raised by these practical difficulties has afforded a basis for a change
in the custody award. In Thalassinos v. Thalassinos"2 the wife who
had been awarded custody was employed on a part-time basis and
absent from her daughter for three days a week. She had employed
several different maids to care for the child in her absence. The
husband, on the other hand, had remarried and his new wife was
not employed. The court, in awarding custody to the father con-
cluded that the wife's absence from her daughter during working
hours "deprives the child of the care, instruction, supervision and
companionship of a parent which are not only desirable but essential
to her well being and happiness."1
3
The mother in that case had attempted to assume the role of
provider out of necessity and had delegated her motherhood role
to a surrogate parent in the person of the various maids she had
employed. The husband had reconstructed the basic family unit
by remarrying. His second wife, who was not working, seems to
have fulfilled the role of motherhood which would more fully
serve the child's best interests.
The wife in Wood v. Wood"4 had taken her two children to
live with another young mother and child. The two mothers, who
were employed at different hours, shared the care of the children.
The husband who had subsequently remarried, sought to have the
custody award changed in his favor. The court found that the wife's
arrangement for the care of her children was temporary at best,
and concluded that she "had not been able to establish a home that
gave assurance of continued adequate care and supervision. "" Cus-
51 Drinan, The Rights of Children in Modern American Family Law, 2 J. FAM. L. 101,
102 (1962).
52 77 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. 1947), afd, 274 App. Div. 807, 81 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1948).
53Id. at 314.
54 207 Cal. App. 2d 33, 24 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1962).
55 Id. at 36, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
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tody was awarded to the father, who "appears to have established
a stable home and was prepared to provide adequate care, super-
vision and training for the children. '
56
These two cases represent an awareness on the part of the
courts of the importance of a sociological inquiry into all of the
circumstances involving parental roles and their relationship to the
responses of the remaining spouse upon dissolution of the conjugal
family.
In both cases the mothers, in order to meet the practical necessi-
ties of their situation as sole parent, had assumed roles opposed to
the traditional notion of motherhood and more analagous to the
fatherhood role. It is submitted that in cases where the mother must
assume the role of father, which the courts have found is usually
not in the best interests of the child, that she should not be entitled
to custody under the traditional "motherhood" test. In such cases,
the mother and father should be considered on an equal role status
and other factors should be given consideration in determining
custody.
III. THE INCOMPLETE USE OF SOCIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS:
A CASE IN POINT
The situation that occurs when custody is to be determined
between one natural parent and third parties presents somewhat
different judicial considerations. One reason is that the cause of
family dissolution may often have been involuntary rather than
voluntary. Family disunity may have resulted from the death of
one parent rather than divorce or judicial separation. A recent de-
cision by the Supreme Court of Iowa in Painter v. Bannister7 has
aroused much public interest and controversy. Although the court
in the Bannister case announces that its decision was in the best
interests of the child,"' the case is an exceptional one in terms of
the assumptions used in its determination.
The issue which usually faces the court in these cases is whether
to proceed on a premise of family unity from the standpoint of
blood ties and parental rights or to regard the child as an entity
apart from the nuclear family. The presumption of parental rights,
stemming in part from old common law doctrines and in part from
the natural notion of blood unity is difficult to overcome, unless
the parent is shown to be unfit.59
5 sId. at 37, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
57 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa), cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 317 (1966).
58Id. at 156.
5 For a discussion of the parental right doctine, see 33 CALIF. L. REV. 306, 309-10 (1945).
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Painter v. Bannister appears to be an attempt by the court to
inquire into the role of the family as a socializing factor in the
child's development. The traditional issue of parental right is not
considered. Instead the court seems to assume as a sociological axiom
the notion of family stability, and further to determine which social
class is exemplary of family stability in the best interests of the child.
It is for this reason that Painter v. Bannister merits discussion.
Mark Painter's mother died in an automobile accident in 1962
when he was three years old. His father asked Mark's maternal
grandparents, the Bannisters, to care for the child temporarily. Two
years later, after Mr. Painter had remarried, he asked the Bannis-
ters for Mark's return, which they refused. An action was filed in
the Iowa District Court to determine custody, which was granted
to Mark's father. The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the custody
decree in favor of the Bannisters. The court found that the life Mark
would be exposed to if custody was granted to his father would be
"unstable, unconventional, arty, Bohemian, and probably intellec-
tually stimulating.' '60 On the other hand, the Bannister farm pro-
vided Mark "with a stable, dependable, conventional, middle-class,
middlewest background and an opportunity for a college education
and profession, if he desires it."'61 The court concluded, "We be-
lieve security and stability in the home are more important than
intellectual stimulation in the proper development of a child."62
There were no issues of parental fitness 63 or parental right64
deemed paramount in Painter v. Bannister. Rather, the court's deter-
mination rested on a choice between two different sociological en-
vironments, which it admittedly did not have a right to consider.65
If the child's best interests required a sociological examination
of different environments, then an inquiry should have been made
into the effects each might have on a child. Instead, the court con-
sidered the testimony of Dr. Hawks, a child psychologist, which
concerned Mark's "father image" as now resting in Mr. Bannister
rather than Mr. Painter. The testimony of Dr. Hawks is not to be
entirely discounted here, but it does seem incomplete in terms of the
sociological issue involved. Yet the court considered it as conclusive
of Mark's best interests. 6
60 Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 156 (Iowa), cert. denied, 87 Sup. Ct. 317
(1966).
61 Id. at 154.
62 1d. at 156.
631d. at 154.
641d. at 156.
65 Id. at 154.
66 Id. at 156-58.
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The court's emphasis on security and stability in the home as
opposed to intellectual stimulation seems to place an extremely high
value on what might be called mediocrity as the desired ideal in a
family relationship. The danger of such a notion has been ably
pointed out:
[I]t is of primary importance that the court should keep its eye
on excellence, and seek to secure the very richest, finest life for the
child, rather than fix its eye on mediocrity and feel that its duty is
done when it has secured so-called normal home life.67
The court in Painter v. Bannister has determined a child's best
interests on the basis of two assumptions of social behavior. First,
by preferring stability in the home over intellectual stimulation, it
would seem to assume that mediocrity in social activity is best for
the individual. Secondly, the court concludes that middle class,
middlewest rural society is the desired example of stability. Un-
fortunately, the court's notions find no basis in the facts of be-
havioral science. As eminent sociologists have stated:
There would be little agreement, even among scholars, as to what
constitutes ... mediocrity, or debasement of culture. From a scien-
tist's point of view there is too little precision in these conceptions
to make them suitable for objective treatment. They fall within more
speculative types of discourse.68
Elsewhere, they state:
Nor does it (sociology) assume that the middle way is everywhere
and always the right way: disparaging connotations of the word
mediocrity, the condition of being intermediate between extremes,
should be enough to ward us off that bland and simple-minded
assumption.6
9
Not only is the assumption that mediocrity and stability are
definable or attributable to a particular social class untenable from
a sociological point of view, it is also in conflict with the constitu-
tional rights of parents to raise their children, enunciated in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters.70 The Supreme Court in that case stated, "The
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize
its children ... "71
The court's decision in Painter v. Bannister raises the question
of whose best interests are really being inquired into, those of the
child or those of society in terms of the kind of child it wants its
67 Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. CH. L. REv. 672, 683 (1942).
68 Nisbet, The Study of Social Problems, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 2 (2d ed.
Merton & Nisbet ed. 1966).
69 Merton, Social Problems and Sociological Theory, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROB-
LEms 791 (2d ed. Merton & Nisbet ed. 1966).
'o 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
7' Id. at 535.
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families to produce. It seems that if such importance has been placed
on the value of the family as a primary force in the child's socializa-
tion process that this question is better left to the family itself.
Also, it must be realized that the family is but one of the social-
izing elements in the child's development. Educational institutions,
peer groups, and to an increased extent in our age of technology,
television and other mass media all contribute to the social develop-
ment of the child. Were Mark Painter to be raised in the Bohemian
environment of the Painter household, could it not be argued that
through the socializing agencies of mass media he would receive
an adequate awareness of middle class mediocrity, at the same time
he would be benefitting from his richer experience of intellectual
stimulation?
CONCLUSION
The best interests rule reflects an awareness on the part of the
courts that the problem of child custody requires the examination
of many non-legal issues. As one court has stated, "The difficulty
of the custody problem lies not in the law, but in an analysis of the
facts and in the application of the law."72
Due to the breadth of the best interests rule, the courts have
been forced to employ various conceptual criteria such as age, sex
and preference of the child, and parental fitness in their analysis
of the facts. Traditional notions of motherhood, fatherhood and
family unity permeate these considerations, serving as tacit assump-
tions of what is in the child's best interests.
A sociological examination of these conceptions demonstrates
that as conclusive presumptions they are incomplete. The role of
motherhood is an effective measure of the child's best interests only
when it is considered in conjunction with other emerging roles of
the modern wife.
Given the alternative responses with which the divorced or
separated custodian is faced upon dissolution of the American fam-
ily, a woman may be forced to shed her traditional role as mother
in order to support her child. Under these circumstances the child
in fact may or may not be deprived of the parental care he needs,
and which the courts assume can only be provided by the traditional
mother.
What is needed in the application of the best interests rule is
a thorough acquaintance with the sociological tools available in
custody matters. In a few cases this need has been recognized by
the courts, suggesting a trend toward a greater awareness of the
Hurly v. Hurly, 411 P.2d 359, 361 (Mont. 1966).
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value of the behavioral sciences in the consideration of child custody
disputes.
The final decision in a custody case still rests with the judge
in his exercise of discretion for the child's best interests. The effec-
tive use of discretion in such matters requires an abandonment of
the misconception that the traditional notion of motherhood alone
is a conclusive test of the best interests of the child. Other con-
siderations must enter into the analysis of the facts. Is the woman
in a particular custody matter fulfilling the role of companion or
partner? Can the mother, if awarded custody, continue to fulfill
her role as a mother, or will she be forced by circumstance to assume
a new role which may be inconsistent with the child's best interests?
Has one of the parents remarried, thereby reconstructing a basic
family unit which might provide a more beneficial atmosphere for
the child?
By departing from traditional notions and addressing them-
selves to a broader sociological analysis of the issues in custody
matters the courts will more fully serve both the best interests of
the child and the interests of the society in which he lives.
Timothy B. Walker
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